Philip Johnson speaks of a couple of forms of Christian Apologetics. One of them he describes as the “Heresy-Rationalist” Model. I will just use “HRM” for it. This model focuses on the accepted dogma from a logical (rationalist) perspective. While Johnson sees value in this model, he also sees its limitations. Here are a couple.

#1. HRM tends to be unconvincing because it puts the beliefs and thoughts of one religion into the framework and concepts of another. If Religion A has its beliefs evaluated by the concepts of Religion B, what would the result be? Well, adherents to Religion B are likely to say, “Wow! Religion A is really messed up!! I am so glad that I am not so stupid as to believe that.” On the other hand, adherents to Religion A are likely to say, “That doesn’t sound like what I believe at all! They have distorted our faith.”

The following is a quote from Johnson,

Take it a step further. Suppose a Buddhist apologist sought to analyze evangelical beliefs, and charted our doctrines according to the categories of Buddhist belief: dukkha, tanha, nirodha, magga, anicca, anatta,
nirvana etc. The resulting portrait would be a strange one indeed precisely because the principle teachings of Buddhism address different questions, conceive of reality in a vastly different way, and operates under a different “cultural logic” from those we find in say the Westminster Confession or the Lausanne Covenant.

Now the same basic issue holds true for evangelical apologists who observe any non-Christian faith, including the new religions. If we intuit that an outsider will not have an adequate or comprehensive appreciation for what it is to be an evangelical Christian simply by reading doctrinal statements, or as in the hypothetical Buddhist’s chart of doctrinal comparisons, then we too must realize there are implications for the way we narrowly seek to understand any non-Christian faith. It is not enough for us to draw up a chart of what a non-Christian group is deemed to believe, especially when the criterion for classifying dogmas is organized on the sole basis of abstract contrasts with orthodox Christianity.

—Philip Johnson, “Apologetics, Mission & New Religous Movements: A Holistic Approach.” Sacred Tribes Journal. Vol. 1 #1 (2008), pg 40.

#2. Religious operate more from a mythical rather than doctrinal mode. In terms of Bloom’s Taxonomy, people are more in the Affective Domain than the Cognitive Domain. They feel their faith more than think it. This is not bad in itself. This is how people operate generally. Thomas Kuhn has noted that even scientists tend to do this when it comes to development of theories— theories that theoretically are developed, challenged, and modified empirically through application of inductive and deductive reasoning. But when I say, myth, I am not referring to myth in terms of truth or falsity, but in terms of culture and story. HRM does little to challenge where religions actually operate in people’s lives.

Irving Hexham and Karla Poewe have discussed the importance of mythological thinking in new religions.
They define myth as:
“a story with culturally formative power. This definition emphasizes that a myth is essentially a story – any story – that affects the way people live. Contrary to many writers, we do not believe that a myth
is necessarily unhistorical. In itself a story that becomes a myth can be true or false, historical or unhistorical, fact or fiction. What is important is not the story itself but the function it serves in the life of
an individual, a group, or a whole society. Myths are stories that serve specific social functions. They enable members of different societies and subgroups within societies to understand themselves
and their world.”

–The quote in this broader quote is from Irving Hexham & Karla Poewe, New Religions as Global Cultures: Making the Human Sacred, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1997, 81.

Mormonism is a good case study of this, (and the one that was being addressed in the paper at that time) but most if not all religions (and probably ideologies in general) operate mythically more than logically. Returning to Mormonism, however, I recall reading an article by a Mormon women. She described how as a young person she did her missionary service and told people so many things. Then years later, she found out that much of what she taught has been shown to be untrue— not even in terms of untrue by non-Mormons, but even untrue by Mormon scholarship. She listed all of the things that she believed before only to be found untrue. The list was quite impressive, and I would wonder if that would be enough to cause a crisis of faith. In actuality, it sounded like it did— but not a change of faith. The story ended with what I would be tempted to describe as an emotional shrug, and commitment to a faith that she holds onto with emotional strength even though with much less intellectual confidence.

Johnson lists other concerns with HRM, especially the tendency of some to have lack of rigor or intellectual honesty in their work. Does this mean that HRM is useless? Nnnnnooooo…. I guess. I think there is a need to understand other faiths… and one simply cannot rely on the adherents of other faiths as the only source for such understanding. Much like studying a culture (and Johnson does recommend in some cases to look at other faiths more as a ‘culture’ than ‘cult.’) one gains a more nuanced picture from connecting to both insider and outsider perspectives. The insider should be knowledgeable, articulate, and experienced. The outsider should be knowledgeable, articulate, … and fair.

Johnson speaks of five other “models” used by counter-cult apologists. These are:

–End-Times Prophecy & Conspiracies
–Spiritual Warfare
–Apostate Testimonies
–Cultural Apologetics
–Behavioralist Apologetics

I am still reading through this LONG article so I cannot speak to these yet. Hopefully later.